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Abstract
While positively connoted tangible cultural heritage is widely recognized as an asset to states 
in their exercise of soft power, the value of sites of ‘dark heritage’ in the context of soft 
power strategies has not yet been fully explored. This article offers a theoretical framework 
for the analysis of the multiple soft power potentialities inherent in the management and 
presentation of sites of past violence and atrocity, demonstrating how the value of these sites 
can be developed in terms of place branding, cultural diplomacy and state-level diplomacy. 
The relationship between dark heritage, soft power and the search for ‘ontological security’ is 
also explored, highlighting how difficult pasts can be mobilized in order to frame positive 
contemporary roles for states in the international system. Drawing on this theoretical 
framework, the article offers an analysis of the case of the Soča valley in Slovenia and the 
presentation of the site of the First World War battle of Kobarid in a dedicated museum. 
Through this case study, the article underlines the particular role of dark heritage for the 
national self-projection of a new and small state in the context of European integration.
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Soft Power and Dark Heritage: Multiple Potentialities
Introduction
Sites associated with modern military conflict, mass violence and atrocities are today an 
integral part of the tangible heritage of many societies (Logan and Reeves 2009: 1), alongside 
more positively connoted cultural resources such as cathedrals, art collections or cityscapes. 
The management and presentation of such heritage is often discussed in terms of the role of 
these sites in the national memory culture, conceived in terms of the national community’s 
attempt to manage its own identity in positive and productive ways, even in the face of such 
dark histories (e.g. Niven 2002; Carrier 2005). Although attention has been paid increasingly 
in recent scholarship to the impact of ‘transnational’ developments in memory cultures, the 
focus of these investigations has been the way in which certain narratives, models and 
approaches for dealing with histories of violence have transcended national borders (De 
Cesari and Rigney 2014; Sierp and Wüstenberg 2015). As yet, insufficient emphasis has been 
given to the multiple and interconnected ways in which the management of such sites might 
contribute to a country’s engagement with the rest of the world and the consequences that 
such engagement might have for the state in the international system. Although recent 
publications by Tim Winter (2014; 2015) have pointed to ways in which states have sought to 
build and maintain relationships via ‘heritage diplomacy’, the heritage Winter discusses is 
very much that of a positively connoted shared culture. Other authors have explored the 
consequences of (failed or successful) management of sites of ‘dark heritage’ (Biran, Poria 
and Oren 2011) in the context of ‘place branding’ (MacDonald 2009; Kobayashi and Ziino
2009: 111), or have noted how debates over the memorialization of sites of battles or 
atrocities can provide a catalyst for reconciliation between states (Logan and Witcomb 2013; 
Beaumont 2016), or indeed for diplomatic disputes (Young 2009: 60). Nevertheless, current 
research has not yet formulated a systematic theoretical conceptualization of the relationship 
between the management of dark heritage and the mobilization of ‘soft power’ (Nye 2011) in 
the context of international relations that would take into account the multiple potentialities 
of such sites and the relationships between those potentialities.
This article will propose that sites of dark heritage contain multiple potentialities in 
terms of their contribution to the state’s soft power, defined (in contrast to the ‘hard power’ 
of force and coercion) as a state’s ability to influence and attract others in the world in a 
number of beneficial ways (Nye 2011: 81-109). By setting out a new theoretical framing of 
the multiple forms of soft power that such sites can promote, it will seek to set a new agenda 
for research that recognizes that sites of war and atrocity are not simply a ‘risk for city- or 
nation-branding strategies’ (Girßmann 2015: 69), but rather a potential resource through 
which various kinds of soft power initiative are currently pursued. While the heritage 
managed at such sites may refer to terrible acts of violence and experiences of human 
suffering, there are potentially a number of benefits to displaying, promoting and 
instrumentalizing these sites in multiple ways that are aimed at foreign audiences of different 
kinds, yet current research lacks a comprehensive approach to understanding the nature of 
such initiatives in terms of their motivations and outcomes.
In order to address this gap in current research, this article will argue that the soft 
power benefits promised by the management of sites of dark heritage are of the following 
four kinds: Place branding as a means of promoting ‘dark tourism’ with its concomitant 
economic benefits; Cultural diplomacy as a variety of public diplomacy, aimed at promoting 
positive perceptions of the nation among foreign publics; state-level diplomacy, in which 
heritage is mobilized to attract attention to the state in question, and to reinforce positive 
relationships with other individual states; and, finally, what we will refer to as the ‘domestic 
dimension to “soft power”’ (Cai 2013: 140) in terms of the relationship between domestic 
memory culture and internationally projected image. As will become clear, although these 
various potentialities of soft power in relation to dark heritage sites can be isolated for the 
purposes of classification and analysis, they also interact and, in an ideal scenario, become 
mutually supporting; but this by no means rules out the possibility that different soft power 
priorities might come into conflict at such sites, particularly given the multiple actors 
involved at multiple levels. Our case study, the Kobarid museum and the surrounding 
landscape of the First World War’s Soča front in Slovenia, also leads us to consider the 
particular benefits that can accrue at these different levels in the case of small states. In the 
case of Slovenia in particular, we find a small and relatively new state that is part of the 
European Union and that has to negotiate a niche role within this supranational entity. In 
addressing these issues, this investigation will also contribute to the recent turn towards a 
consideration of the role of memory in international relations (Bell 2006; Langenbacher and 
Schain 2010), as well as highlighting links between soft power, memory, and place that have 
so far remained under-explored in the relevant scholarship. In doing so, it will seek to open 
up a new area of enquiry relevant not only to scholars of international relations, tourism and 
heritage, and memory studies, but also to policymakers and heritage professionals. 
Place branding and dark tourism
Place branding can be understood as the attempt to market a particular location for the 
purposes of attracting inward investment, customers for its export products or visitors for its 
tourist industry, and therefore has a clear economic impetus. Place branding can focus on the 
local, regional or even national level (where the term ‘nation branding’ is more commonly 
used), and can take place in a coordinated, top-down fashion in the form of national branding 
strategies, or in a less coordinated way by multiple state and non-state actors at various 
levels. This distinguishes the branding of place from the branding of a commercial product: 
‘Place branding involves multiple stakeholders, often with competing interests; unlike 
product branding, place branding is seldom under the control of one central authority.’ (van 
Ham 2008: 133)
Place branding rarely works from an entirely clean slate. External publics are likely to 
have some pre-conceived notions that constitute a more or less defined ‘brand image’ 
(Arnholt 2007: 5). For some places, it may well be the case that the most salient fact that 
others are aware of, especially outside of the country, is that they were the site of a battle or 
an atrocity. Indeed, some locations are synonymous with such events (e.g. Ypres, Auschwitz, 
Srebrenica). The widespread practice of ‘dark tourism’ (Lennon and Foley 2004) or 
‘thanatourism’ (Seaton 1996) represents an important economic factor for some locations, yet 
this ‘commodification of death for popular touristic consumption’ (Stone 2013: 307) needs to 
be balanced against the other functions of these sites, including burial, commemoration, 
religious observance, and education (Ashworth and Hartmann 2005: 11). The marketing of 
dark heritage has the potential to bring visitors into local businesses (hotels, restaurants, 
shops, etc.) with a significant economic impact. This is particularly the case where the 
heritage in question can be described as wholly or partly ‘extraterritorial’ (Beaumont 2016), 
that is to say that a foreign public has a particular historical stake in the events in question, 
either because they are survivors or veterans of an atrocity or a conflict, or because they are 
literal or metaphorical descendants of those who were directly involved (e.g. Australian 
tourist ‘pilgrimages’ to various sites of World War One and World War Two battles, or 
Israeli youngsters visiting concentration camp sites in Europe).
Understood in broad terms as the ‘power to attract’, soft power in this context means 
the ability to make relevant foreign publics aware of the site in question, to address their 
conceptions of the role of the historical event that took place there and their expectations of 
any potential visit, and thereby to offer an experience at the site that will address their various 
needs, while also taking into account potentially competing local needs. However, as with 
other forms of soft power, the ability of any one of the potential domestic or external actors 
involved to ‘wield’ (van Ham 2010: 67) that power in any unmediated way in order to 
produce a pre-determined outcome must be in question. In addressing our case study of the 
Kobarid museum and its surrounding memorial landscape of the former Soča front, we will 
seek to understand how the interacting agenda of actors with a stake in such place branding 
have led to specific (and changing) presentations of the site over time, and to assess these in 
terms of their soft power implications.
Dark heritage sites and cultural diplomacy
Public diplomacy is normally defined in terms of those policies implemented by a state in 
order to create positive and beneficial impressions among the publics of other states. Where 
this is achieved through the promotion of particular cultural products (music, literature, 
fashion, etc.) or is undertaken by cultural institutions such as museums, orchestras, or opera 
companies, the term cultural diplomacy is generally applied (Mark 2010: 43). There is a 
consensus that cultural diplomacy works best where states rely on networks of autonomous 
(although often state-funded) institutions to engage with foreign publics on their behalf (Cull 
2010: 13-14; Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010), and memorial museums at sites of dark 
heritage represent one variety of such institutions. We will argue that dark heritage sites can 
be framed by various actors in ways that project positive images of the state in which these 
sites are located; if not in terms of the events themselves (which remain terrible and are 
acknowledged as such), then certainly in terms of way in which the state in question deals 
with that heritage in the here-and-now, and in terms of how it draws conclusions about the 
future based on those past events.
Given our focus on multiple actors elsewhere, it will also be important to 
acknowledge that it is not merely state-level foreign policymaking elites who may seek to 
project a specific role for Slovenia through the Kobarid memorial and the Soča front (Wehner 
and Thies 2014: 416). Increasing competition at the sub-national level has given rise to 
various forms of para-diplomacy on the part of local actors. Border areas, in particular, can be 
very active in establishing transnational linkages, especially at times of deep political change 
and/or when they feel legitimised by supra-national political structures like the EU. As 
Lecours (2002: 103) argues, ‘[p]olitical supra-national structures such as the EU legitimize, 
as a result of their transformation of state sovereignty, the bypassing by regional governments 
of central institutions.’ 
Specifically, we will see how the EU practices its own forms of supranational cultural 
diplomacy in the region, promoting its own goals of peace and economic and social
integration. Since 2007, the EU has developed an agenda to promote culture in its external
relations (EU 2014: 20) and has aspired to exercise soft power in its own right. As Isar (2015: 
505) argues, within the EU ‘non-state actors have been key policy entrepreneurs of this new 
agenda, in a pattern rather distinct from the manner in which cultural diplomacy is elaborated 
by national governments.’ Ang, Isar and Mar (2015: 378) in turn state that ‘the EU’s policy 
settings may provide the current benchmark for the adoption of more cosmopolitan ideals in 
cultural diplomacy.’
Cosmopolitan ideals have also inspired the EU’s approach to historical memory and 
dark heritage. Anna Cento Bull and Hans Lauge Hansen (2016) have observed three potential 
modes for the presentation of historical conflict: the antagonistic, the cosmopolitan, and the 
agonistic. Drawing on the work of Chantal Mouffe, they define antagonistic heritage as 
heritage that upholds sharp distinctions of friend and foe, refusing to recognize the other’s 
view of history and maintaining a historical sense of enmity. The mode of cosmopolitan 
memory is often regarded as an antidote to such antagonistic conceptions, in that it tends to 
focus on victims of historical suffering and invite identification with that suffering, while 
simultaneously downplaying the complicity of ordinary people in the violence that caused it. 
In the cosmopolitan mode, all are victims of historical ‘evil’, but that ‘evil’ remains largely 
unexplored. By contrast, an agonistic memory discourse is counterhegemonic and tries to re-
politicize the past and the relation of the past to the present through the unsettling of 
established identity positions and relations. This mode of remembering gives voice to all 
parties in a conflict, contextualizes victimhood and perpetration, and engages with people’s 
emotions and passions insofar as they can facilitate critical reflection and self-reflection. In 
post-conflict societies, agonistic memory and dialogue can promote the transformation of 
previous enemies into adversaries sharing the same democratic space. Whereas the public 
sphere in many post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including Slovenia, 
experiences an antagonistic memory culture between different societal groups that is highly 
politicized in the domestic context (Mark 2010), the EU explicitly favours a cosmopolitan 
approach as the best way to foster peace and reconciliation. In this context, it may be 
strategically advantageous to promote a more cosmopolitan view of selected aspects of the 
nation’s dark heritage when addressing international (especially European) audiences and/or 
when aligning with EU values and norms; although this does not rule out the possibility that 
foreign publics may themselves experience a markedly antagonistic memory culture in 
relation to that same heritage. 
State-level diplomacy and dark heritage
Drawing on role theory in international relations, we will argue that the benefits that states 
can draw from such positive perceptions of their management of dark heritage relate to 
perceptions of their roles in the international system.
In the early 1970s, K. J. Holsti proposed that we conceive of each state’s international 
role as being constructed in the interaction between ‘role conception’, i.e. how states see their 
own role in the international system, ‘role prescription’, i.e. how other states see their role, 
and ‘role performance.’ Role performance refers to the actual actions that each state 
undertakes on the international stage, from the limited range of options available to it given 
its own view of itself and its awareness of others’ views (Holsti 1970: 240). Pertinent to any 
study of the function of memory in such role construction is also Aggestam’s notion of ‘role 
set.’ This refers to the many and sometimes contradictory roles a state perceives itself as 
playing, or is perceived as playing, but which taken together give it an identity in the 
international system (2004: 67-8). At any given time, different role conceptions and 
expectations may come to the fore, while the perception of the state’s identity, both internal 
and external, remains intact. In this article, we will examine how our case study, the site at 
Kobarid and the associated Soča front, has been co-opted to the development of the ‘role 
conception’ of the Slovenian state in the post-communist world. We will argue that, by means 
of intermediary heritage institutions, states like Slovenia can seek, for example, to promote a 
positive image of themselves in terms of their commitment to peace, reconciliation and 
related values, but may also project for themselves a particular role in their region or the 
wider world in relation to those values.
The visiting of memorials, cemeteries and (increasingly) memorial museums at sites 
of battles or atrocities, is now a feature of many state-level diplomatic interactions (e.g. 
summits, official state visits), particularly where the violent past in question directly involves 
the nations who are engaging in dialogue. What Matthew Graves (2014) has termed 
‘memorial diplomacy’ can involve such joint visits to memorial sites, with the laying of 
wreaths and the making of speeches, but also joint memorial projects. Through such actions, 
state representatives symbolically express their shared construction of the past, which implies 
both shared values (e.g. commitment to peace) and a shared view of their relationship to each 
other. Memorial politics can ‘underline the solidity of alliances forged in war and renewed in 
times of peace’, but may also ‘set the stage for the rapprochement of former belligerents’ and 
serve as a ‘pretext for the establishment or restoration of bilateral relations between 
governments, the first step in the reconciliation between nation states’ (Graves 2014: 177).
However, as Graves also notes, this dominance of elite actors, in the form of state 
representatives, is increasingly accompanied by action on the part of ‘devolved parliaments, 
regional authorities and decentralized public administrations or municipalities […], museums 
and other institutional caretakers of public memory’, but also by a range of civil society 
groups and even individual citizens (2014: 171).
Such visits and rituals are highly public and highly symbolic in nature, and as such 
constitute a kind of mutually signalling of the nature of the relationship between the states in 
question, both for their own consumption but also for that of other parties. For small states in 
particular, who experience more marked asymmetries of power in their relationship with 
others, the mobilization of dark heritage sites potentially promises the opportunity to 
highlight their preferred understanding of their relationship to their interlocutor, which is
symbolically assented to by their alter where its representatives consent to participate in 
rituals located at dark heritage sites.
As Christopher S. Browning has claimed in relation to the process of nation branding 
(2015), the quest to establish a stable national role conception that is likely to be recognized 
and accepted by others through the national self-projection also serves a second important 
need: namely, that of ontological security. A growing body of scholarship argues that states 
are not only existentially challenged by ‘the possibility of physical threat from other actors 
and global entities, but also [by] the prospective transformations and developments that call 
into question a state or group’s identity’ (Innes and Steele 2014: 16). Such identities need to 
be discursively maintained through the construction of a consistent ‘biographical narrative’ 
for the state (Steele 2014: 527), yet where violent national pasts cannot be incorporated into 
such a coherent narrative, they represent a potential threat to the state’s ability to formulate a 
positive identity for itself in the international community, which in some cases can lead to 
denial or avoidance (Zarakol 2010). Conversely, dealing successfully with a difficult past can
lead, as the case of Germany paradigmatically demonstrates, to a positive sense of one’s role 
in the world (Welch and Wittlinger 2011). In the case of Slovenia, the focus of the Kobarid 
site is, as we will show, particularly fruitful, in that allows Slovenia to present itself as the 
guardian of a heritage of war around which both a domestic and an international consensus 
can be constructed, whereas other elements of Solvenia’s history (especially its experience of 
the Second World War) would be subject to significantly greater internal contestation.
Multiple potentialities of soft power at dark heritage sites
While it is possible that a particular site may serve only one form of soft power, for instance 
by attracting tourists while playing no role in cultural or state-level diplomacy, it is also the 
case that such sites can serve all of these functions in inter-related ways. The ideal in terms of 
potential positive outcomes would be that place branding, cultural diplomacy and state-level 
memorial diplomacy are mutually reinforcing. 
In the rest of this article, we will seek to map the dynamics of such interactions in the 
particular case of the Kobarid museum and the surrounding memorial landscape of the Soča 
front, which is at once a tourist destination, a site that seeks to promote international 
reconciliation between foreign publics, and a significant destination for visits by foreign state 
representatives. At the same time, we will situate these dynamics in relation to our fourth 
dimension of soft power in terms of Slovenia’s ongoing struggles over the meaning of its past 
and the relationship of that past to its present and future identity, a terrain that remains 
dominated by antagonistic contention at the domestic level.
In summary, this article will show how dark heritage is a potential soft power 
resource, especially for a new and small state like Slovenia, which faces particular challenges 
in ‘receiving recognition from the rest of the world for who [it] claim[s] to be’ (Bátora 2005: 
6). Nevertheless, as with other forms of soft power, it will become clear that the involvement 
of competing agents and multiple audiences makes such sites of dark heritage no more 
‘wieldable’ in terms of achieving planned outcomes than we would expect in the case of
other heritage resources.
The case study has benefitted from extensive fieldwork, including a number of 
interviews with museum guides and heritage curators in Kobarid, as well as analysis of 
visitor books, which helped establish the multiple factors accounting for the origins and 
subsequent development of this area as a major heritage site. The research was carried out as 
part of a project funded by the EU and entitled UNREST: Unsettling Remembering and 
Social Cohesion in Transnational Europe.
The construction of Kobarid and the Soča valley as dark heritage sites in pre-
independence Slovenia
The Soča or Isonzo valley is located on the border between Slovenia and Italy. During the 
First World War this was the site of twelve battles fought by the Austro-Hungarian and the 
Italian Army. During the twelfth battle at Kobarid (Caporetto), 8 kilometres from the Italian 
border, the Italian army suffered a humiliating defeat that led to the death or wounding of 
40,000 of its soldiers and the capture of over 280,000 Italian prisoners (Fabi 2009; Falls 
1966; Macdonald and Cimprič 2011; Schindler 2001; Thompson 2008). These twelve battles 
‘left deep scars in the physical landscape’ (Saunders et al. 2013: 49) in which ‘the traces of 
military action and the multiple overlapping legacies of the war’s aftermath are still visible’ 
(61). Among these legacies of war are trenches and military barracks, graves and cemeteries
with the bodies of soldiers from the Austro-Hungarian, German and Italian armies, chapels 
and churches, including a Russian Orthodox chapel built by Russian prisoners of war in 
memory of more than 300 fellow nationals killed in an avalanche, as well as commemorative 
monuments built after the war. The name of Caporetto itself remains embedded in the Italian 
national psyche and continues to be widely used to signify a devastating debacle. 
Despite the intrinsic unique relevance of this border area, the Soča valley was largely 
ignored as a heritage site by both historians and public institutions from the aftermath of the 
war until Slovenia’s independence in 1991. Yet the impact of the war on Slovenes was no 
less seismic than for many other nationalities: ‘the post-1918 official amnesia of World War I 
and the Soška front stands in stark contrast to the obvious fact that World War I was a 
seminal and tumultuous experience for Slovene soldiers, civilians and their political leaders. 
Its tremendous costs were very clear in both human suffering and economic costs’ (Kranjc 
2009: 217-18). As Kranjc argues, this was partly due to the fact that the Soča valley was 
occupied by fascist Italy after the war and turned into a landscape of graves and monuments 
in memory of the Italian dead. There were other reasons, however, which accounted for the 
prevalent amnesia, including the difficulty for the inter-war Yugoslavian Monarchy to 
commemorate soldiers who had fought for Austria-Hungary against the Serbs, a factor which 
persisted in Tito’s Yugoslavia. The Second World War later further dislodged the memory of 
the Great War. Slovenia was dismembered and divided between Italy, Germany and Hungary 
while the ensuing civil war between the pro-Tito Liberation Front and the Slovene 
collaborators of the fascist and Nazi occupiers – the so-called domobranci – led to the latter 
being summarily executed or fleeing abroad after the partisans’ victory. Tito’s Yugoslavia 
then opted to remember the heroic partisans’ war which marked the birth of the Communist 
regime, disregarding the previous conflict.
It was only after Tito’s death in 1980 that historians started to pay attention to the 
Great War, while on the Soča front itself a myriad of individual collectors started creating
private museums and even selling military objects to interested buyers. Interviews with 
founders and curators of the Kobarid museum established that in 1989 a local politician in 
the Kobarid area, Zdravko Likar, conceived the idea of setting up a museum of the First 
World War in the town open to the public. His primary and explicit aim was to capitalize on 
the thousands of Italians who visited Kobarid every day in order to buy cheap petrol, meat 
and cigarettes, enticing them to stay longer and visit a museum whose focus would be 
explicitly on the twelfth battle in which so many Italian soldiers had lost their lives. Likar’s 
second aim, as he himself stated, was political rather than touristic and commercial, in so far 
as he was convinced that Slovenia would soon acquire independence and this would lead to 
its re-establishing good relations with Western Europe, starting with neighbouring Italy. 
Likar had already established close ties with the Slovenian minority in the Italian region of 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia and saw these links as a potential springboard for cross-border 
cooperation (Pagavino 1989).
In short, considerations of place branding and tourism played a major role in the 
decision to launch Kobarid and the surrounding area as a dark heritage site of international 
standing and relevance. The relevance of the term Caporetto for the entire Italian nation was 
well known to locals, given that Kobarid was the site of an Italian Ossuary commissioned and 
inaugurated by Mussolini himself in 1938 that already attracted visitors from that country. In 
this sense, Kobarid was very clearly constructed as an ‘extraterritorial’ heritage site 
(Beaumont 2016) and, indeed, continues to function as a site of pilgrimage for many Italian 
visitors, who often come to the museum in search of traces of ancestors involved in the 
battles and record the purpose of their visit in the visitor book. Nevertheless, from the very 
beginning of the museum project, its instigators had recognized the potential of the site in 
terms of cultural diplomacy as a means of enhancing cross-border relations.
The museum opened in 1990 as a private, non-profit venture. Its permanent exhibition 
deliberately presented an anti-war message in the cosmopolitan mode now favoured by EU 
institutions (Cento Bull and Hansen 2016), focusing on the suffering and plight of soldiers 
irrespective of which side they fought for. As interviews with curators established, 
controversial issues such as the flight and surrender of thousands of Italian soldiers to the 
enemy after the defeat of the twelfth battle were deliberately not dealt with, not least in order 
not to antagonize or upset the hoped-for Italian visitors. Similarly, the Italian fascist 
occupation of the Kobarid area is not part of the main exhibition on the First World War but 
relegated to two rooms dealing with the history of the town. In this section, the issue of the 
Communist partisans and of the collaborators with the fascist occupiers is not explained or 
probed. As the museum went on to attract growing numbers of visitors, it effectively became 
the defining factor in the branding of the town: Kravanja (2014: 102) has argued, ‘[w]hen the 
Kobarid Museum started to develop the story of the WW1 in the 1990s, Kobarid got an 
entirely new identity. The town started to be named after the museum and not vice versa’.
The early development of the Kobarid Museum before Slovenian independence 
clearly demonstrates that local actors had recognized the potential of the site in terms of place 
branding in a touristic context, while also recognizing the future potential of the Museum and 
the wider memorial landscape in relation to cultural diplomacy. Following Slovenian 
independence, however, the Slovenian state began to take a strong interest in Kobarid as a 
resource for cultural and state-level diplomacy.
The Soča front’s new role in cultural and state-level diplomacy
As early as 1992, the Kobarid museum gained national recognition when it was awarded the 
Valvasor Prize by the Association of Museums of Slovenia. In 1993, the Museum was one of 
the finalists for the European Museum of the Year award. In the same year, it received 
the Council of Europe Museum Prize. These awards in turn marked a significant period of
growth in the number of visitors, with international tourists greatly outnumbering domestic
ones. The success of the museum, whose founders had also started to develop outdoor sites
linked to the First World War in the surrounding area, began to attract the attention of the
Slovenian state. Ten years after the opening of the Kobarid museum, the government began 
to take an active interest in the site and above all in the memory of the First World War, 
funding the creation of a cultural foundation in the Soča Valley (the Pot Miru Foundation). 
As it is stated on the website of the Foundation:
In order to preserve, restore and present the historical and cultural heritage of the First 
World War in the Soča Region, the Slovenian Government adopted a ten-year 
programme in 2000. On its initiative, a foundation to implement the programme was 
established. The non-profit Walks of Peace in the Soča Region Foundation was 
established on 1 December 2002. (Pot Miru n.d. a) 
 
Kravanja has explained this decision in terms of the state’s own interest (2014: 93): ‘after a 
decade of successful promotion in Europe with a remarkable WW1 story and a strong anti-
war message, Kobarid became an interesting political medium for the state of Slovenia’. 
Specifically, he argues (2014: 104) that by promoting the memory of the First World War 
Slovenia ‘was able to detach itself from the “Yugoslavian” history of the WW2 and started to 
present itself with a Europeanised version of history’. However, we would also stress the 
domestic dimension of prioritizing the memory of the First World War at the expense of that 
of the Second World War. By this point, Slovenia had become embroiled in memory rifts 
around the role of partisans and collaborationists during the Second World War, with the 
latter demanding a reappraisal of their aims and stance and denouncing the mass executions 
carried out by the partisans after the war (Luthar und Luthar 2010). The highly politicized 
nature of this dispute (Šumi 2012: 158-160) over the proper commemoration of those killed 
in the Second World War and its aftermath has taken on an antagonistic mode rather than an 
agonistic one, with the result that the transformation of former enemies into adversaries 
sharing the same democratic (agonistic) space is proving difficult to achieve. In this context, 
no coherent national self-image based on the memory of this period is possible, which in turn 
means that that memory cannot offer a coherent foundation for Slovenia’s self-projection in 
the region and more widely. Kobarid and the Soča front, in contrast, can be promoted as a 
history that offers the possibility of consensus without threatening to further ‘poison’ (Cox 
2005: 138) contemporary domestic politics.
The site has proved to be extremely versatile as a resource for furthering Slovenia’s 
foreign policy goals and promoting its own role conception in the region and in the EU more 
widely. In a 2015 official publication, the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly 
states that the country’s foreign policy priorities include: good relations with Russia; strong 
ties with central European countries; cross-border cooperation with Italy (in light of the large 
Slovenian minority across the border), but also with Croatia and the Balkan countries;
multilateralism, international peace and cooperation; and a stronger, more integrated, 
efficient and transparent European Union (Republic of Slovenia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2015). The Soča front can be mobilized in pursuit of all of these goals, as it provides a space 
in which Slovenia can interact with foreign publics (as tourists) and foreign elites (as official 
visitors) and reinforce its association with the positive values of peace, reconciliation, cross-
border collaboration and multilateralism.
As well as becoming actively engaged in promoting the Kobarid site through the Pot 
Miru Foundation, the state has used the site for conducting high-level diplomatic interactions. 
Today the Kobarid museum and related Soča front is one of five sites privileged by Slovenian 
governments for state-level visits. On repeated occasions, foreign Prime Ministers and 
Presidents, especially from Italy and central European countries, are taken to visit the 
museum in order to reflect publicly on the destruction wrought by war as well as the 
desirability of peaceful relations. 
In terms of relations with Russia, the front includes the presence of a Russian 
Orthodox chapel and Russian graves, repeatedly visited by President Putin in diplomatic 
encounters with Slovenia. Slovenia-Russia relations were first established in 1992 and in the 
last ten years have intensified, while Russia is an important trade partner (Gower 2013). Such 
diplomatic encounters have been aimed at fostering good bilateral relations, promoting 
dialogue with the EU and, more recently, sending out a clear message about the necessity of 
ending the current EU sanctions against Russia for its actions in the Ukraine crisis since 
2014. The pivotal role played by the Russian chapel on the Soča front for Slovene-Russian 
relations is highlighted by Benedejčič (2016). As he points out, an annual memorial service 
is held at the chapel. However, whereas in the 1990s commemorative events were mainly 
informal,
since 2000 the list of participants at the annual commemorations has become a 
veritable ‘who’s who’ roll call not only on the Slovenian, but also on the Russian side 
[…]. In 2015, despite the tensions in relations between Russia and the West, the 
chapel was visited by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and in 2016 the 
Russian President Vladimir Putin was invited to mark its centenary. (Benedejčič 
2016: 1158-9)
As far as the second of Slovenia’s foreign policy priorities is concerned, Kobarid’s
status as the site of a series of battles that saw the involvement of all central European armies 
can be highlighted in order to emphasize Slovenia’s role in promoting good relations between 
central European states. A visit to the Soča front therefore underlines the common past shared 
by central-eastern Europe as well as its present unity of purpose. In terms of relations with 
Italy, as already mentioned, Kobarid was the site of a battle that involved a major defeat for 
the Italian army, as well as hosting a major Italian ossuary, where every year a ceremony is 
held in memory of the dead. Since 1991, the museum has presented itself as another place 
where the battle can be remembered and it is not a coincidence that Italians make up its
largest group of visitors after Slovenes. In 2007 the museum welcomed the Italian Prime 
Minister Romano Prodi, who stated that ‘[w]e built Europe so that tragedies like the one that 
took place at Caporetto will never happen again’ (Bongarrà 2007). As for building bridges 
with Croatia and the other south-eastern European countries, the Soča valley is the site of 
graves and cemeteries of Balkan soldiers killed in the First World War, including Muslim 
Bosniaks. In June 2012, an official ceremony marked the unveiling of a monument in honour 
of fallen Bosnian soldiers. The ceremony took place at Log pod Mangartom, where the 
President of Slovenia Danilo Türk welcomed two members of the presidency of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Bosniak Bakir Izetbegović and the Croat Željko Komšić. On that occasion, 
Izetbegović delivered a strong message of peace and reconciliation:
This Ceremony too is an opportunity for us to testify that at places like this the history 
lessons are best learned and for us to send the messages of peace, to our region before 
all which still has not buried all of its dead from the wars of the 1990s, but to Europe 
too with the hope and belief that the 21st Century we shall spend without wars and 
bloodsheds. [sic] (Izetbegović 2012)
As also shown by the above quotations, the Kobarid museum and the Soča valley 
align with the aim of international peace and cooperation, as the emphasis of both the 
museum exhibition and the presentation of the multi-national graves scattered around the area 
is on wartime suffering and the folly of war. The promotion of the site in the context of 
cultural diplomacy, aimed both at visiting tourists and at other foreign publics, seeks to 
position Slovenia as a nation dedicated to the promotion of peace and reconciliation across 
formerly contested borders within a region scarred by multiple conflicts during the twentieth 
century. The rhetoric around the ‘memorial diplomacy’ (Graves 2014) practiced during 
various state visits by foreign leaders seeks to reinforce Slovenia’s role in this respect. 
However, while internationalism or cosmopolitanism ‘is embedded in the framework of 
Slovenian foreign policy thinking’ it should also be noted that this is very much in line with 
the priorities of the EU, which assumes ‘that there are cosmopolitan norms and values that 
transcend the particularistic claims of discrete political communities’ (Zupančič and  
Hribernik 2011: 38). Clearly, by adopting the Soča front as a resource for the cultivation of 
its soft power, the Slovenian state is promoting a role conception for itself that is compatible 
with the EU’s efforts to promote its own values across borders. In this respect, as Zupančič 
and  Hribernik argue, small states like Slovenia may emphasize the contribution of their soft 
power strategies to such an agenda ‘since there are certain niches in the framework of the EU 
that can be filled up by such states’ (2011: 38). However, the EU itself has also sought to 
intervene directly with its own policy at the Soča front in ways that call into question 
Slovenia’s ability to successfully cultivate this ‘niche.’
Constructing the Soča front as a borderless heritage site
The EU has provided funding and support for the historical heritage sites along the Soča 
valley thanks to its Cross-Border Cooperation Programme between Italy and Slovenia, 
especially in the period 2007-2013. Specifically, the programme funded the project entitled 
‘Pot Miru – Via di pace (Walk of Peace) – Historic Trails of the First World War’, a series of 
walking trails running from the Alps to the Adriatic. Jointly supported by the Pot Miru 
Foundation in Kobarid, the Walk of Peace planned to ‘create a unique cross-border cultural 
route connecting the existing trails among the historical legacies, tracks and cultural heritage 
of the different regions’ (CBC Programme Italy-Slovenia 2007-2013 n.d.). The aims of the 
project were both commercial, to promote tourism in the area, and cultural. From the EU 
perspective, there was also an explicit wish to enhance cross-border relations and a European 
sense of belonging. There are also plans to establish a European Peace Memorial Park on the 
trail, thereby showcasing the EU as a positive force for peace. 
In many ways, the motivating forces driving the EU to actively engage with the 
memory and heritage of the First World War in the Soča valley are similar to those of the 
Slovenian state. The message of peace and reconciliation arising out of the terrible suffering 
caused by the war is a shared one, made even more poignant in view of the Balkan conflicts 
of the 1990s. Yet, through its Cross-Border Programmes, the EU is also pursuing its own 
supranational agenda and this can lead to tension with a newly sovereign state like Slovenia.
Over the last few decades, cross-border cooperation has been used as a strategic 
instrument of the EU that seeks to change the way borders should be conceived: ‘from being 
dividing lines of separate spaces they have turned into the reason for co-operation’ 
(Christiansen, 2014: 68). Already in the 1980s new forms of multi-level governance 
involving the European Commission and the regions were being developed (Bullmann 1994; 
Jones and Keating 1995; Heinelt 1996). From the 1990s cross-border cooperation became 
part of the EU transnational strategy of cooperation and integration, involving also private 
and local actors, which facilitated the possibility to transcend national boundaries. More 
recently, the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), has become a strategic 
tool to facilitate transnational cooperation and soften the borders between the European state-
members
This new form of governance has contributed to the erosion of the self-contained 
nation state (Christiansen and Jörgensen, 2000; Magone, 2007), since the traditional 
indivisible sovereignty of nation-states has been replaced by a multi-layered, ‘network 
governance’ (Filtenborg and Johansson 2002). Boundaries are blurred by ‘direct contacts 
between sub-state actors of various types as well as the inclusion of non-public sector 
organizations in cross-border institutions’ (Blatter, 2004: 533). In the case of EGTC, the 
nation-state is no longer the only actor. This situation may cause frictions between the sub-
national, the national and the supra-national level.
The Primorska area (or the Slovene Littoral) where Kobarid is located, has been the 
arena of an intense cross-border activity between Italy and Slovenia. In particular, the 
European Commission created three Interreg programming periods (1989–1993; 1994–1999; 
2000–2006) to reinforce cross-border/transnational co-operation. As already mentioned, the 
historical and cultural heritage related to the First World War along the Soča river benefitted 
financially from the Cross-border Cooperation Programme Italy-Slovenia 2007-2013. 
Specifically, the Walk of peace project promoted educational and cultural activities in an area 
extended between the Carnic and the Julian Alps, which is due to be further developed as far 
as the Adriatic Sea. 
Cross-border cooperation projects have partnered Slovenia with the Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia region rather than with Italy as a whole. As Nadalutti (2012: 194) argues, while the 
state of Slovenia has benefitted from cross-border activities, this has meant that the whole 
Slovenian nation has to some extent been treated as if it were on a par with the Italian regions 
taking part in the Cooperation Programme. Interreg 2007-2013 also introduced the 
Regulation 1082/2006 on ‘European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation’ (EGTC – the 
Upper Adriatic Euroregion) which enabled local entities to undertake cross-border projects. 
However, given that the members of the EGTC are considered equal in terms of status, 
Slovenia was once again put on the same level as Italian regions. This is the reason why the 
country was reluctant to accept the agreement to build a ‘small’ Euroregion instead of a 
bigger one, which would also have included Stiria (Austria) and Hungary. Signs of tension 
appeared when in 2005 Slovenia failed to attend the first meeting for the creation of the 
EGTC and the prime minister Janša declared that the country should enter the Euroregion as 
a state (Nadalutti 2012: 189).
In the EU-driven process of regional integration, we therefore see Slovenia insisting 
upon its status as a nation state, pushing back against the implication that it is a mere region 
of the wider EU. These tensions between the EU’s strategy of promoting regional integration 
and the desire of the Slovenian state to remain a sovereign actor with its own clearly defined 
identity within the EU and the world more widely are reflected in the way EU-funded
projects related to the heritage of the First World War in the Soča valley are advertised on 
official Slovene sites. For instance, the site of the Slovenian Pot Miru Foundation in Kobarid 
underlines the role of Slovenia in establishing and funding its activities, while the role of the 
EU is downplayed (Pot Miru n.d. b). SLOVENIA.SI, the official site that promotes the 
country with the brand ‘I feel Slovenia’, advertises the Walk of Peace as follows:
Walk of Peace in the Soča Region foundation is an important member of the National 
Committee for the Commemoration of World War I Anniversaries, funded by the 
Government of the Republic of Slovenia and headed by the Minister of Defence.
(SLOVENIA.SI n.d.)
Despite the fact that the EU funded 850,000 Euros out of a total budget of 1 million 
for the Walk of Peace and contributed financially to several other projects, the site never 
mentions the EU, even though it refers to ‘the values of cross-border cooperation’ and the 
importance of ‘promoting the European commitment to peace’. Similarly, when the 
Slovenian president Danilo Türk visited the Walk of Peace in 2012, he did not mention the 
EU cross-border cooperation programmes. However, he made reference to his wish to create 
a Peace Park as ‘the place to cherish common European values of peace, coexistence and 
cooperation for the future when marking the 100th anniversary of events related to World War 
I’. He added that he had discussed this with the Presidents of Italy, Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia as well as other countries whose citizens had fought 
in the Soča battles (Office of the President of the Republic of Slovenia 2012). 
Despite the priorities of Slovenian foreign policy remaining aligned with the values of 
the EU, the Slovenian state is clearly at pains to stress its own agency in promoting those 
values. While it has a strong interest in participating in the Interreg programmes (not least the
presence of autochthonous Slovene minorities in neighbouring countries) it is wary of
allowing the EU to co-opt the Soča front to the EU’s normative agenda, preferring instead to
stress its own niche role in the promotion of that agenda. While, as Zupančič and Hribernik 
have argued, ‘[a] small state like Slovenia can […] contribute most to said normative power 
by aligning its foreign policy to help promoting human rights, as well as the spread of 
democracy’ (2010: 41), Slovenia’s emphasis on its own active role in promoting such values 
via the commemorative landscape of the Soča front serves to emphasise its own agency and 
mitigate the impression that it is merely riding on the coat-tails of the EU’s regional agenda. 
In this sense, the Slovenian state seeks to maintain its sense of ontological security as a 
distinct and purposeful actor in the region, whose agenda emerges from a clearly defined 
national narrative, drawing on the heritage of Kobarid and the Soča front to do so. 
Conclusion
We began this article by making the claim that sites of dark heritage have multiple 
potentialities in terms of the exercise of soft power in the context of international relations
and that these potentialities had not yet been fully explored by current research. In order to 
address this deficit, we proposed that the use of sites of dark heritage for the purposes of soft 
power needed to be understood in four distinct yet potentially interconnected ways. Our study
of the Kobarid museum and the related memorial landscape of the Soča front has 
demonstrated how these four soft power potentialities have evolved and interacted at one site 
that is particularly rich and complex in terms of its historical associations and its present 
status. We have demonstrated through this case study that the place branding, cultural 
diplomacy and state-level diplomacy all frame this site in specific, yet ultimately interrelated 
ways, which can be understood both in terms of the national memory culture of Slovenia and 
in terms of the Slovenian state’s desire to promote a distinct role for itself, in this case in the 
context of the EU, which allows it to maintain a clear sense of identity in the international 
community and thus bolster its sense of ontological security. The emphasis on the First 
World War in the Slovenian context is particularly noteworthy in respect of this history’s 
consensus-building potential as a ‘cosmopolitan’ memory, which avoids any agonistic
engagement with the country’s civil war during the Second World War, but also leaves this 
latter conflict the subject of antagonistic contestation in the domestic political sphere. At the 
same time, the more cosmopolitan narrative of Kobarid, focused on peace, reconciliation and 
cross-border cooperation allows Slovenia to present itself as a niche advocate for the
normative values of the EU. Nevertheless, we have shown how the Slovenian state has 
struggled to defend its niche role in the promotion of such normative European values 
through the management of its dark heritage, emphasizing its own agency in the face of 
apparent attempts to co-opt the Soča front into the EU’s broader cross-border regional policy. 
In defending its active role in the mobilization of dark heritage in the region, Slovenia affirms 
a particular role conception that emerges from a national historical narrative and thus 
underpins its wider sense of ontological security. This tension is a product of Slovenia’s 
status as a small and relatively new state in the context of the European Union, yet also points 
to the fact that, when it comes to the mobilization of dark heritage in the service of soft 
power, the nation state is no longer the only game in town. Processes of regional integration 
and globalization may well impact on the ability even of larger states to instrumentalize their 
own dark heritage in the service of their own soft power agenda. However, the consequences 
of this development remain to be investigated through further case studies.
What is clear, however, is that the various potentialities of sites of dark heritage as 
resources of soft power can be mutually reinforcing in productive ways. The Kobarid 
museum and the surrounding memorial landscape of the Soča front address foreign publics at 
multiple levels and in different ways, yet there is little evidence in this case study that the 
evolution from place branding to cultural diplomacy to state-level memorial diplomacy was 
anything more than an ad hoc affair. As with other forms of soft power (Arnholt 2007: 74), 
what has been lacking in the Slovenian case is a clearly developed strategy that draws in the 
various stakeholders in a systematic way and seeks to maximize all of the potential soft 
power benefits of the site in a coordinated fashion. This is not surprising, given the 
unresolved issues related to the memory of the interwar period and of the Second World War. 
While tangible dark heritage of the kind investigated here was once regarded as representing 
a negative legacy of violence, conflict and even of shame, states are becoming increasingly 
aware of the soft power potentialities that we have outlined in our discussion. Those 
potentialities might be more fully realised by policymakers and heritage professionals, 
however, through the development of more integrated multi-level approaches. Arguably, 
working through their difficult pasts might help states to develop more effective strategies.
In terms of the research agenda that this article has sought to open up, we would also 
argue that more attention needs to be paid among scholars of international relations, heritage 
and tourism, and memory studies to the soft power potentialities of sites of dark heritage in 
order to fully understand their function in contemporary society. In this article, we have 
proposed a model for approaching these multiple potentialities that provides a basis for 
further research in this area. 
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